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Categorizing the purpose and methodology of the interdisciplinary sub-
fi eld of “law and literature” with any consistency is a thorny venture. 
From Jane Baron’s early work on the topic, naming humanism, herme-
neutics, and narrative, as the three strands around which law and litera-
ture studies were performed, to Julie Stone Peters’ more recent article 
revisiting these three “projects” of the law and literature “movement,” 
scholars continue to explore the way disciplinary edifi ces both respond 
to each other and resist interactive morphoses. Yet, despite the limits of 
the cultural studies methodology we have often employed to understand 
the fi eld of law and literature—a method largely responsible for the pre-
vailing mode of descriptive observation signaled by the way we now 
begin and litter many of our papers with “the way in which”—studying 
law and literature alongside one another enables us a glimpse at how 
discrete textual and discursive forms meet to contribute to our tacit em-
brace of seemingly fi xed and unyielding concepts. Thus, examining legal 
doctrines alongside literary texts in a sociohistoric context provides us 
the opportunity to grasp a more coherent, albeit not necessarily uncom-
plicated look at the ways cultural notions are generated and disseminat-
ed within and across localities and nations. 
This article will look particularly at three forms of text—literary, legal, 
and cinematic—to study the way the cultural idea of “sovereignty” has 
evolved through a mingling of disciplinary narrative images. Examining 
one particular decade, the 1960s, and one particular anchor, the United 
States, this essay will examine environmental writer Gary Snyder’s 
1960’s literary work Earth House Hold, the legal text of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1968, and the cinema of the 1960s pertaining to the Vietnam 
War, to ponder how conceptions of sovereignty have been developed 
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in the cultural imaginary. As this essay will discuss, when read together 
these discrete disciplinary forms provide an interpretive collage which 
illuminates how sovereignty became aestheticized as an interconnected 
process of constant activity—a dynamic subject to continual transfor-
mation rather than static being. This dynamic, continually transforming 
subject infl uenced not only the 1960s and the United States, but con-
ceptions of sovereign systems, people, and nations across the globe for 
decades following. 
The 1960s—a decade when national identifi cation was so intimately 
linked with geographical deployment in and beyond the United States—
offer us a snapshot of the ontology and operations of jurisdiction and 
sovereignty. The numerous permutations and rewritings of legality, 
counter-culture, and geographic identifi cations makes this decade ripe 
for exploring the ways texts unearth the complexities of personal and na-
tional sovereignty. Given the preoccupation with determining America’s 
geographic and ideological location—where it was and should be in the 
late 1960s, as well as how and where to fi nd the idea of America and “its 
enemies”—it is less than accidental that texts that invoked geography 
became fundamental parts of counter-cultural production. They partici-
pated in an ongoing consideration of individual and state relationships 
to geographic and ideological American space. Both legal discourse, and 
literary narratives worked in the late 1960s to reformat American legal 
subjects’ relationships to their land, sense of nation, and racial affi lia-
tions domestically and globally. Particularly, Gary Snyder’s Earth House 
Hold and the Civil Rights Act of 1968 use geography to reveal the com-
plexities of personal and national sovereignty, which still haunt us today. 
There is perhaps no greater American impulse than that of the negotia-
tion of the contradictory channels of sovereignty. From the construc-
tion of the classic liberal subject free to exercise his own volition over 
himself, to the American denial of “personhood” to slaves until the mid 
1800s, to the exercising of First Amendment Rights to speak oneself, 
to the restrictions on speech designed to limit words designed to incite 
violence, the United States has been grappling with how to balance ac-
knowledging the ideal “sovereign” individual body with the ideal na-
tional “sovereign” since its inception. Still in the contemporary climate, 
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we see the United States working out our often-untenable understand-
ings of sovereignty on a daily basis.1 This essay will examine a micro-
cosm of the ongoing negotiation of sovereignty’s contradictions, by ex-
amining the United States treatment of Native Americans in the 1960s. 
Pivotal in demonstrating and creating the issues that people, subject 
to Americanization, confront around personal and national sovereignty 
today, the 1960s help reveal the technologies of sovereignty still operat-
ing within America and throughout the globe in curious ways. 
In a recent forum of PMLA, Peter Brooks and Julie Stone Peters 
comment on the impact legal and literary disciplines might have on 
each other. To improve the potential outcomes of the law and litera-
ture movement, Brooks calls for “setting law in something resembling 
a transferential relation . . . to other humanistic disciplines,” and Stone 
Peters, nodding to the form of transferential relation she has previously 
described, replies that this transference takes the form of “each disci-
pline’s reenactment of a primal loss and projection of healing power 
onto the other discipline” (Brooks and Stone Peters 1646, 1647). If it 
can be said that the struggles for sovereignty take shape both in liter-
ary and legal discourse, then examining the ways literature and legality 
respond to each other’s senses of loss and potential healing is a potent 
mode for thinking both about the ways sovereignty has been shaped and 
re-shaped, and also how literature and law have been mutually consti-
tuted in the process.
I. The 1968 Civil Rights Act—Legal Sovereignty
The 1968 Civil Rights Act, particularly Titles II through VII, recon-
strued the U.S. government’s jurisdiction over Indians, and Indian land, 
as part of the United States’ ongoing engagement with Indian autono-
my. The Act both extended U.S. ideology to Indians, holding them ac-
countable for and subject to the U.S. Bill of Rights, while it also limited 
U.S. jurisdiction subject to Indian consent. Title II of the Act, Section 
202, declared, for instance, that “No Indian tribe in exercising powers 
of self-government shall make or enforce any law prohibiting the free ex-
ercise of religion, or abridging the freedom of speech, or freedom of the 
press . . .” (Docs 250). Other freedoms designated by the Bill of Rights 
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were similarly reiterated there: the right to be secure against unreason-
able search and seizures, the right not to be compelled to be a witness 
against oneself, the right to a speedy trial, equal protection of the laws, 
and due process. Section 203 of Title II also provided for the right of 
habeas corpus, for a U.S. court to test the legality of detention by an 
Indian tribe. This right of habeas corpus came on the heels of the previ-
ously decided 1965 case Collifl ower v. Garland, where the U.S. Court of 
Appeals, 9th circuit, held that tribal courts were in effect a part of the 
federal system, and that the Federal court had jurisdiction to issue a writ 
of habeas corpus to determine the validity of detention of an Indian by 
a tribal court. The court there reasoned that “[i]n spite of the theory 
that for some purposes an Indian tribe is an independent sovereignty, 
we think that in the light of their history, it is pure fi ction to say that 
the Indian courts functioning in the Fort Belknap Indian community, 
are not in part, at least, arms of the Federal government. Originally 
they were created by the Federal Executive and imposed upon the 
Indian community and to this day the Federal government still main-
tains a partial control over them” (Docs 247).2 The implications of the 
Collifl ower case are signifi cant. This case created precedent showing that 
the “name” of sovereignty and the “practice” of sovereignty are distinct, 
and would be treated differentially by the courts. Because the Federal 
government still maintained partial “control” over the Indian communi-
ty, it would not consider the tribal courts at Fort Belknap “entirely” sov-
ereign. Rather, they were neither “sovereign” nor “subservient.” They fell 
into an uneasy, uncategorizable space. In Collifl ower, and beyond, sover-
eignty came to exist on the separate planes of theory and historical prac-
tice for the courts. As a category, or mode, sovereignty was not complete 
or totalizing. It was already divided and inconsistent in nature—and 
could be parsed into the separate components of idealized and practiced 
spaces. To be named a sovereign, then, is not necessarily to be treated 
as, or act, as one. The signifi er does not delimit the assumed parameters 
of the signifi ed. Sovereignty instead depends on an oscillatory space be-
tween name and performance. 
The boundaries between the Federal Government and the sovereign 
Indian courts are similarly blurred in Title III of the 1968 Civil Rights 
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Act. This Act provided that there should be a Model Code developed 
by the Secretary of the Interior, to “govern the administration of justice 
by courts of Indian offenses on Indian reservations” (Docs 250). This 
model code included items like 1) Indians tried for similar offenses on 
reservations to those which might be tried in federal courts, shall have 
the same rights as they would in a federal court; and, 2) Indian judges 
shall have proper qualifi cations and be properly educated with classes 
for the training of judges. The American legal system here maps itself 
onto Indian land and thought. 
Yet, even with this ideological umbrella of national rights placed atop 
Indian reservations, the Civil Rights Act nonetheless also limited juris-
diction by demanding Indian consent to the State assumption of juris-
diction over civil and criminal offenses. Under Title IV, States could 
assume jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in 
Indian country within that state, only with “[t]he consent of the Indian 
tribe occupying the particular Indian country or part thereof which 
could be affected by such assumption” (Docs 251); Section 406 of Title 
IV claims that state jurisdiction is applicable in Indian country “only 
where the enrolled Indians within the affected area of such Indian coun-
try accept such jurisdiction by a majority vote of the adult Indians voting 
at a special election held for that purpose” (Docs 252). The Secretary of 
the Interior was deemed to call that election when “requested to do so 
by the tribal council or other governing body, or by 20 per cent of such 
enrolled adults” (Docs 252). The complexities of jurisdiction—as an 
amalgam and evolution of the history of imperialism and expansion—
are apparent from this Civil Rights Act. Abstracted systems of rights 
were applicable to all Indians, while explicit state assumption of rights, 
or physical jurisdiction over tribal land, was limited.3 The law, rework-
ing the role of the reservation in the American imaginary, maintains a 
separation, albeit one which could be renounced, between the space of 
the autonomous reservation, and the jurisdiction over American rights 
which applied to all persons on that reservation. This distinction also 
followed closely on the heels of President Johnson’s message to Congress 
in 1968, which forged the path for this divide between geographic 
placement and abstracted citizenship rights. In that “special message to 
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Congress, in March of 1968 on the problems of the American Indian, 
the forgotten American” (Docs 248), Johnson claimed that “We must 
affi rm the rights of the fi rst Americans to remain Indians while exercis-
ing their rights as Americans” (Docs 249). Johnson thus reiterates an 
ontological foundation of “being” Indian, while also suggesting that the 
essence of Indian-ness can co-exist alongside the pragmatic action of 
performing the exercise of being American. “Underlying this program,” 
Johnson says, “is the assumption that the Federal government can best 
be a responsible partner in Indian progress by treating the Indian him-
self as a full citizen, responsible for the pace and direction of his devel-
opment” (Docs 248). In Johnson’s emphasis on self-help and respect for 
Indian culture, he proposes a coordinated effort from several Secretaries 
including Interior, Agriculture, and Commerce, to work together in 
providing federal assistance programs for Indians. To create this united 
attempt, he divides the Indian into that citizen which is geographically 
locatable, but who can partake of expansive and diffuse American ide-
ology. This thought process is also replicated in the Civil Rights Act, 
which further tears at the distinction between local living and national 
identifi cation. 
II. Gary Snyder, the Environmentalist Writer and Literary Sovereignty 
In the case of sovereignty, the complexities of legal jurisdiction mapped 
onto Indians within national borders through legal codes also served as a 
site of struggle for literary artists grappling with aesthetic identifi cation. 
Gary Snyder’s Earth House Hold, written in the same cultural moment 
as the Civil Rights Act of 1968, functioned to invoke not only the idea 
of the Indian but also the land of the reservation as a place for reformu-
lating both the abstracted idea of the “American” and the materialized 
way Americans lived on the planet. Snyder’s counter-cultural narrative 
inures the reservation with a double power: it uses the land of the res-
ervation to hypothesize a new sense of American identity and action, 
while it also calls into question the very formation of the legal space of 
the reservation evolving at the time. Snyder presents us with a jurisdic-
tional paradox, which reverberates in the looming contradictions of the 
Civil Rights Act itself.
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Snyder has been forthright in his foregrounding of the need to con-
sider the role of geography in identity formation. He said, for instance, 
in a Road Apple Interview of 1969/70, that “[y]ou should really know 
what the complete natural world of your region is and know what all 
its interactions are and how you are interacting with it yourself. This 
is just part of the work of becoming who you are, where you are” 
(Real Work 16). Earth House Hold certainly follows this paradigm for 
living, as it uses the example of the reservation to examine the idea of 
America. Snyder uses the notion of the reservation to re-envision the 
way American’s local and national identities are constructed in relation 
to the land they live on. Yet, even looking to the particular locale of the 
reservation, Snyder also seeks to redefi ne the nature of “region” and ar-
guably “identity” altogether. In his “On Earth Geography” interview, 
he claims that:
establishing the criteria for defi ning a region . . . a set of criteria 
. . . in itself is very interesting . . . since, even though we know 
better, we are accustomed to accepting the political boundaries 
of counties and states, and then national boundaries, as being 
some kind of regional defi nition . . . and although, in some 
cases, there is some validity to those lines, I think in many cases 
. . . the lines are often quite arbitrary and serve only to confuse 
people’s sense of natural associations and relationships. (Real 
Work 24). 
Working against the political creation of identity born of passive ac-
ceptance of nationally constructed borders, Snyder suggests we should 
break our minds out of “the molds of political boundaries or any kind of 
habituated or received notions of regional distinctions. . . . because po-
litical entities, and the boundaries drawn by national states and so forth 
don’t represent any sort of real entity” (Real Work 24). 
To fi nd an alternative to the sort of dangerously fi ctionalized nation-
alism Snyder alludes to, where citizens imagine unreal boundaries be-
tween nations, Snyder turns towards the Indian culture subsisting on 
the reservation. He looks at the formation of cultural units linked to 
particularities of land affi liations as old, yet importantly revisited sites 
148
Va l e r i e  K a rno
for refashioning cultural identity. In “Passage from More to India” and 
“Why Tribe,” from Earth House Hold, Snyder invokes the notion of 
the tribal unit as a return to a regional core; this return, he suggests, 
holds the promise of a reinvented relationship to political and geograph-
ic boundaries. When he ponders the 1967 San Francisco human be-in, 
which he refers to as a “Gathering of the tribes” (Earth 103), he recalls 
the posters of South-Asian Indian Sadhus and Native American Indians. 
Affi liating tribal identity with geographic location, he says, “The tribes 
were Berkeley, North Beach, Big Sur, Marin County, Los Angeles, and 
the host, Haight-Ashbury . . .” (Earth 103). Claiming that tribalism is 
based both in a series of practices linked to one’s land, yet divorced from 
the ownership of that land and contingent in some ways on a nomadic 
relation to the nation, Snyder presents us with the paradoxical ways in 
which tribal identifi cation is or is not linked to land mass. In think-
ing about the tribe he says, “we use the term tribe because it suggests 
the type of new society now emerging within the industrial nations. In 
America of course the word has associations with the American Indians, 
which we like” (Earth 113). Emphasizing the nomadic nature of trib-
alhood, Snyder adds that “This new subculture is in fact more similar 
to that ancient and successful tribe—the European Gypsies—a group 
without nation or territory which maintains its own values, its language 
and religion, no matter what country it may be in” (Earth 113). Snyder 
here appeals to the value of maintaining an indigenous relation to the 
land, as well as embracing a traveling notion of tribalhood devoid of 
linkage to one land mass or political entity. Snyder’s further reliance 
on Zen Buddhism, Hindu mythology, and Native American spiritual-
ity in other sections of the text anchors Snyder’s insistence on the im-
portance to tribalhood of identifying with universal forms of nature. 
Invoking larger natural categories Snyder says, for instance, that “men, 
women, and children—all of whom together hope to follow the timeless 
path of love and wisdom, in affectionate company with the sky, winds, 
clouds, trees, waters, animals, and grasses—this is the tribe” (Earth 116). 
Snyder’s emphasis on communing with the natural components of land 
functions to idealize geographic elements, which are seen to resist na-
tional borders.
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This reliance on localized yet nearly transcendent identifi cation with 
geography correlates with the U.S. presence abroad in Vietnam in the 
late 1960s. Arguably, part of the counter-cultural movement of which 
Snyder was a part was necessarily implicated in linked efforts to halt 
both ongoing violence towards U.S. minorities (and explicitly Native 
Americans), and the projection and displacement of domestic racial vio-
lence onto other nations. Several scholars have stipulated the interrela-
tionships between domestic and international affairs. Amy Kaplan has 
suggested, for example, that “international relations reciprocally shape 
a dominant imperial culture at home, and . . . imperial relations are 
enacted and contested within the nation. . . . Foregrounding imperial-
ism in the study of American cultures shows how putatively domestic 
confl icts are not simply contained at home but how they . . . spill over 
national boundaries to be reenacted, challenged, or transformed” (“Left 
Alone with America” 14, 16).
Indeed, a signifi cant portion of Snyder’s writing evaluates and links 
both Native American sovereignty battles, and the warfare in Vietnam. 
Though much of Snyder’s prose uses spirituality to look inwards, rather 
than cast opinions about the U.S. role in international affairs, Snyder 
does himself comment on the American ferocity abroad towards the 
Viet Cong. Despite stating that “nationalism, warfare, heavy industry 
and consumership are already outdated and useless” (Earth 116), Snyder 
does note in reference to the war in Vietnam that “the American Indian 
is the vengeful ghost lurking in the back of the troubled American mind. 
Which is why we lash out with such ferocity and passion, so muddied a 
heart, at the black-haired young peasants and soldiers who are the Viet 
Cong. That ghost will claim the next generation as its own. When this 
has happened, citizens of the USA will at last begin to be Americans, 
truly at home on the continent, in love with their land” (Earth 112). 
Snyder links national identity (being Americans), with private sensa-
tions of comfort and affi liation (feeling home in the geographic locale 
of the continent). The U.S. response in Vietnam seems, for Snyder, to 
be at least partially located in its subconscious awareness of the lurking 
American Indian consciousness, waiting to reclaim both land and ide-
ology for the continent and return the American geography to a right-
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ful notion of “being American.” Arguably, the projection of the per-
ceived threat outside of American soil serves to refocus and seemingly 
quell fears that the Indian “way of life” will overcome American ideol-
ogy. Moreover, ostensibly, the United States kills the visible threat of 
the Vietcong to eclipse Americans’ lurking fears of the more hidden 
threat of Indians within U.S. borders: Indians who challenge the vital 
intersectionality of our geographic and ideological locations. Snyder’s 
vision of the haunting Indian, waiting to bring America back to a geo-
graphic relationship to the planet, underlines the way in which a po-
tential return to a native sensibility can be seen as both an impetus for 
and reaction to U.S. war involvement abroad. Philip Deloria has com-
mented on these assumptions, claiming, “when it came to the war, the 
semantic and semiotic linkages could hardly have been more appropri-
ate. Racially “red” Indians matched up well with the ideologically “red” 
Vietcong, and both joined “youth” as pure, antimodern primitives. . . . 
Countercultural rebels became Indians to move their identities away 
from Americanness altogether, to leap outside national boundaries . . . 
and offer what seemed a clear-eyed political critique. Yet, if being Indian 
offered one an identity as a critic of empire, that position was hardly un-
complicated” (Deloria 164, 166). 
The complications resulting from this alignment with Indian iden-
tifi cation derive in part from the dynamics of empire itself. American 
citizens, privileged by their relationship to the American nation, had an 
easy ability to shift identifi cations to a group who themselves had been 
at the core of negotiating the nature of sovereign status. As the maintain-
ers of empire, American citizens could choose at discrete moments how 
they wished to visualize their positions as sovereigns. American Indians 
lacked that option, yet American citizens opting for Indian identifi ca-
tion never willfully surrendered their positions of sovereign choice. 
Gary Snyder’s work helps elucidate this complication as he rethinks 
the notions of jurisdiction and sovereignty inherent in empire—an issue 
endemic to postcolonial theory but one that arguably has traditionally 
excluded Indians from its overall purview.4 Snyder’s resistance to inter-
national violence in Vietnam gets envisioned through a return to an al-
ternative geographical matrix—the reservation—one intriguingly linked 
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to a space existing simultaneously both within and outside U.S. legal 
jurisdiction, and one which has itself been historically known as a site 
replete with violence. His work functions to reveal for us the paradoxes 
created by legal jurisdictional codes, themselves grappling with Snyder’s 
very questions: What are the relationships between material borders and 
ideological transgressions? Can they be jurisdictionally bounded or even 
regulated? The very consideration of these troubled categories, as a sort 
of confl ictual montage present in the 1960s, is a presage to the com-
plexities of globalization and postcoloniality in the twenty-fi rst century. 
Examining the contradictions of jurisdiction and sovereignty enables a 
better understanding of their deceptively totalizing infl uences. 
In considering the ontology of sovereignty, some scholars have sug-
gested that the notion itself betrays a sense of autonomy and relies in-
stead on mutuality. Elizabeth Heger Boyle and John Meyer have argued, 
for instance, that notions of national sovereignty depend not on iso-
lated nation states, but global, even universal renderings. They assert, 
“Sovereignty is a peculiar claim: it is a claim to autonomous decision-
making power, but under exterior universal principles and addressed 
to an exogenous and often universal audience. The idea of sovereignty 
itself emanates not from each nation independently but from the global 
recognition of the nation-state form” (Boyle and Meyer 69). Whether 
sovereignty appeals to a universally available principle or not, the notion 
that the sovereign body demands to be witnessed within a certain frame 
of autonomy—that it be perceived by others as presiding over itself—is 
compelling. And yet even the witnessing of self-declaration is not with-
out complication. For what must be abjured in order to claim or witness 
sovereignty? As this article will later suggest, peculiar notions of devel-
opment must be jettisoned for sovereignty to be witnessed. 
Examining the nature of sovereignty, in an effort to understand its 
impacts, leads us to search for its location. But if, as Amy Kaplan has 
argued for instance, empire is understood not to be the static result of 
relations between domestic and foreign forces, but rather one emanat-
ing from “ambiguities,” “contradictions,” and “anarchic” networks of 
disorder (Anarchy 1), then searching for the location of tempestuous 
sovereignty is itself an elusive act. Moreover, if we accept, perhaps as a 
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key to democracy itself, Hardt and Negri’s premise that in our mode of 
imperial sovereignty, “there is no place of power—it is everywhere and 
nowhere. . . . It is a non-place” (Empire 190), and that consequently “if 
there is no place outside, then we must be against in every place” (Empire 
211), then seeking to impact sovereignty is an attempt to impact a non-
place, or an interstitial one. 
Ironically enough, the reassertion of the import of local and regional 
studies has been involved in literally insisting on the viability of place as 
critical to impacting the elusive space of non-place. Such, in part, was 
Gary Snyder’s method in Earth House Hold. But even beyond that strat-
egy, Snyder looked into a further query: What is the relation between 
personhood, or personal sovereignty, to the legal orders which them-
selves follow the pathways of the contradictions of empire and national 
sovereignty? Snyder invites us to inquire into how one—in their own 
personal sovereignty—avoids an affi liation with the deceptive concept 
of national sovereignty. A partial response to this inquiry is that the 
concept of national sovereignty, as notion, arguably belies a “thingness” 
which itself is without place. This “thingness” creates for the individual 
a distraction of fi ctional belonging to national boundaries which them-
selves counteract or complicate personal sovereignty. 
Critic Bill Brown, in what he identifi es as a fundamentally modernist 
question of “things” and their “thingness,” has asked about the degree 
to which there are ideas in things that exert pressure on us to engage 
them as something other than mere surfaces (12). For Brown, mod-
ernist art explored the compulsion with turning representation into 
“thingness” in American culture. He claims that a fundamental strain 
of modernism was to “imagine the work of art as a different mode of 
mimesis—not one that serves to represent a thing, but one that seeks 
to attain the status of a thing” (3). He also observes that after the turn 
of the century, “the effort to sell things . . . and to accumulate things 
had an inevitable result . . . Americans now lived life peculiarly pos-
sessed” (5). If some tenets of modernism can be seen as extending, or 
even expanding into the contemporary moment, we can think about 
how the representation and “thingness” of sovereignty has led to seeing 
the nation as an artistic form—no longer just representing its citizens 
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but taking on its own properties—with depth, levels, and contours. 
This vision of the sovereign as thing leads to an aestheticization of the 
national body and endows it with properties like affect and beauty. The 
aestheticized national body arguably in turn masks the ideas which 
have formed this “thing.” The Civil Rights Act of 1968 is an excellent 
example of this operation. There, representations of sovereignty are 
seen in terms of the good and willing body both establishing itself and 
tacitly, if not explicitly, consenting to national form. Particularly, the 
Act aestheticizes tribalhood in relation to the nation. Although legal 
holdings are not generally seen either as representations or as aestheti-
cizing, we can see from the Civil Rights Act that the defi nition and ful-
fi llment of personhood and tribalhood are indeed represented as bear-
ing certain qualities with aesthetic properties: Section 201 of Title II 
claims for instance that “Indian tribe means any tribe, band, or other 
group of Indians subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and 
recognized as possessing powers of self-government” (Docs 250). This 
suggests then that the notion of “tribe” itself is linked to and depen-
dent on issues of subjection and recognition. Indian tribes are those 
that are witnessed to be split: they are subject to U.S. national jurisdic-
tion at the same time they are recognized through the lens of posses-
sion—possessing powers of self-government. They are a tribe because 
they are witnessed to possess certain “things” essential to the process of 
being seen: namely, they can be seen because they are deemed to exist 
in the realm of having “things”—in this case powers.5 They can be, and 
are represented because of the way in which they are aestheticized as 
containers for these things. And, as such, these containers (“tribes”) 
are launched necessarily by the Civil Rights Act, and other legal acts, 
into the realm of the aesthetic, albeit in non-explicitly stated ways. 
Additionally, individuals who possess rights are similarly positioned 
as vessels that autonomously secure those rights. The extension of the 
United States Bill of Rights to Indians in the 1968 Civil Rights Act 
then leads to posing questions like, “What does sovereignty over per-
sonhood mean if personhood is conceived of as a thing? What images 
does personhood produce if persons are conceived of as artistic forms 
with levels, surfaces, and contours? 
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Personhood’s relation to national legal orders has been examined 
elsewhere in areas like equal protection and slavery. Stephen Best’s 
work on the history of personhood in the United States, for instance, 
has revealed some of the paradoxes of personhood that get invoked 
in thinking about jurisdiction. Best argues that historically concepts 
of personhood have mingled with notions of things. As he suggests, 
“slavery provides a particular historical form of the ongoing crisis in 
which persons are treated as things, and things as persons, one that 
lends historical depth and contour to the subordination (at century’s 
end) of personality to the property relation” (38). Citing this example 
as one of many metaphoric substitutions occurring in the law, and 
fundamental to it, Best suggests that, “the relation between persons 
and things, and conceiving persons as things, becomes a varying pre-
occupation of the law in the aftermath of slavery” (39). While his ar-
gument underlines how the “thing-person” dichotomy in U.S. law has 
been central to the formation of legal protections for voice, thoughts, 
emotions, and sensations in right to privacy cases where the right to 
personality becomes a piece of self-ownership (Best 50), it also offers 
a launching point for examining how, in cases not of personal sover-
eignty, but national sovereignty, the nation as a “fungible” good can 
be subject to similar problems inherent to the person. If both national 
and personal sovereignty have resided partly in their status as “things,” 
aestheticized and representational, then the contemporary moment, as 
well as the nineteenth century about which Best writes, should attend 
to the ways in which national and personal sovereigns get aestheti-
cized. Such a focus will enable a more comprehensive examination of 
sovereignty, one that will help reveal the problematic complexities of 
sovereignty itself. 
In the case of American Indians, this aestheticization of the per-
sonal and national sovereign body has created images of Indians sim-
ilar to those of other postcolonial bodies.6 Yet, U.S. governmental 
acts concerning Native Americans have largely been treated by crit-
ics outside of postcolonial parameters. As Louis Owens has asserted, 
“surprisingly, it would not take much time spent browsing through 
contemporary critical/theoretical texts—including especially those 
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we call postcolonial—to discover an even more complete erasure of 
Native American voices” (13). Owens lists the numbers of theorists, 
including Edward Said and Homi Bhabha, who, according to him, 
dismiss or silence indigenous Native American voices and writing 
even as they theorize postcoloniality (13). This sentiment is echoed 
by Kathryn Shanley and John Purdy when they consider how both 
postcolonial theories and cinematic images of Indians have erased 
Indians in history (Shanley 26, Purdy 112). As a remediation of this 
erasure, John Purdy has suggested that fi lmic renderings like Gerald 
Vizenor’s Harold of Orange are successful in “reversing images [pop-
ularly ingrained in his audience] . . . by problematicizing the direc-
tional framework inherent in the paradigm—[by] demonstrat[ing] 
the ideological and thus ethnocentric foundations upon which they 
are based . . .” (112). Purdy commends Vizenor for forcing a “reimag-
ining” of orientations, frames of reference, and thus representations 
with which we are all familiar” (112). 
These representations that challenge dominant paradigms of sover-
eignty are especially essential since legal acts and cases themselves are 
already propelling us into the realm of representation and aesthetics. 
Thus, cinematic images that refl ect back on sovereignty itself by de-
manding newly conceived inclusions of the Indigenous in history are a 
natural extension of and response to a legal system that has already tac-
itly imagined sovereignty within the written text.7 Cases like Collifl ower 
v. Garland and The Civil Rights Act of 1968 formulated conceptions of 
sovereignty through legal doctrine, and cinema engages with these pro-
ductive legal notions. The cinematic image in particular reveals whether 
or how the “thingness” of sovereign personhood and nationhood—in 
the case of the 1968 Civil Rights Act represented in bodies and tribal-
hood replete with inalienable rights—operates. It reveals the ambigui-
ties and ambivalences of sovereignty, ambivalences that show “transi-
tional social realities” (Bhabha 1) as inherent to the contradictions of the 
sovereign image. Through the cinematic image we can start to under-
stand and refi ne the importance of personal and national sovereignty, by 
thinking about its relation to bodies and the global interactive fl ows of 
personhood in which we participate.
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III. Cinema and the Sovereign Image
In the context of the 1960s, several fi lms were made which directly ad-
dressed the ways in which the localized idealization of the U.S. Indian—
embattled with issues of sovereignty refl ected in the 1968 Civil Rights 
Act—was used as a canvas to both refl ect and create the problems of 
development and sovereignty fought over in Vietnam. Bruce Baillie’s 
Quixote has used, as David James has suggested for example, “. . . recur-
rent image clusters in which the remnants of the pre-colonial past—its 
geography, its fauna, and especially the richness of its aboriginal cul-
tures—coalesce, fragments of an Indian summer shored against the ruin 
of the modern metropolis” (160–61). To envision the dilemmas of de-
velopment, Baillie’s “collision” editing shows “adobe ruins and young 
Indian girls supplanted by industrial machinery gouging the earth” 
(160). Likewise, in the fi lm Mass for the Dakota Sioux, as James points 
out, indigenous culture is “presented as a prelapsarian ideal, fall[s] to 
industrialism . . . and war” (161). There, however, “the utopian alterna-
tive is Vietnam, which like the domestic Third World is ravaged by the 
technology of corporate capital. But whereas the Indians of the West 
could be known or at least seen directly, Vietnam is knowable only in-
directly, through television” (161). James notes that the fi nal shot of 
the fi lm reminds the viewer that the technologically underdeveloped 
Indians and Asians are joined through the color red which fuses their 
connection (162). He contends that the aesthetic qualities of the fi lms 
allegorize social values by using the representative of counterculture and 
the emblem of the Third World, the American Indian (163–4). In these 
particular 1960s fi lms then, cinematic technology is used to show the 
ways in which American Indian and Third World bodies get similarly 
aestheticized in the service of demonstrating both the problems of U.S. 
imperialism, and the projection of U.S. racial tensions abroad. 
Aside from overtly highlighting the interconnectivity between domes-
tic and foreign imperial relations, cinema’s properties also themselves 
reveal the instability of sovereign systems, calling into question condi-
tions of being in sovereign things. The cinematic image’s movement 
through time and space inherently questions the qualities of autono-
my, static being, and linear progression. Delueze’s philosophy of cinema 
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has extensively shown how the cinematic image embraces “becoming” 
rather than fi xity (58–9). As critic Brian Flaxman has highlighted about 
Deleuze’s ideas, cinema has the capacity to “de-territorialize the cogito” 
which has “dominated Western philosophy,” so that images get seen 
and experienced anew relative to prior “rituals of representation” (2–3). 
Cinema creates concepts because it removes us from what we have ac-
cepted as familiar. In so doing, it resists our recognizing the same pre-
dictable images repeatedly, and creates possibilities for witnessing new 
forms. Thinking through cinema about sovereignty opens up opportu-
nities for understanding personal and national sovereign states because it 
can create conditions of possibility for reimagining the aestheticization 
of global citizens and sovereigns. By refl ecting on the cinematic image, 
we cannot only glimpse how sovereign aesthetics have been created, but 
can disrupt them as well by destabilizing rigidifi ed representations. We 
can begin to unpack, or even eschew sovereignty’s often unspoken total-
izing infl uences by overtly visualizing what has previously been implic-
itly imagined through legal texts. As Flaxman has noted, Deleuze focus-
es in part on “judicial fi lms” because he is interested in the problem of 
narration leading to judgment (36–7). Much like the way Gary Snyder’s 
work interacts with legal doctrines of the 1960s, so too does cinematic 
narrative imagine the problems and potential new conceptions of our 
judgments about what constitutes the individual and national sovereign 
body. Images and texts are in dialogue about the emerging discourses of 
sovereignty. 
Moreover, Deleuze’s philosophy of cinema assists us in processing 
troubling notions of development attendant with contemporary consid-
erations of sovereignty. Deleuze posits that the essence of a thing appears 
in the course of its development—rather than in a static quality. This 
notion of development differs from the same term’s usage in contempo-
rary theories of democracy and globalization. In the exportation of de-
mocracy and perpetuation of gloablization, development gets deployed 
as an economic telos rather than embraced as an ontological mode. 
When considered in light of sovereignty, however, a nation or person 
can be seen or experienced not solely for its economic progression or 
ideological alignment, but rather for its ontological development. When 
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understanding the sovereign image, Deleuze’s ideas compel us to imag-
ine that if the ‘essence’ of a sovereign individual or nation appears in the 
process of development, that development is one in which the economic 
telos of development is abandoned. Development entails not linear and 
systematic progression towards an economic goal, but rather a constant 
process of interacting and becoming. Sovereignty, then, might be aes-
theticized not as an embrace of static separate things—distinct vessels 
possessing qualities—but rather as an interconnected process of con-
stant activity. Such a process would create alternative images of sov-
ereign personhood and nationhood, which could themselves shift our 
conceptualization of troublesome sovereignty itself. Thinking through 
cinema as a foundational mode offers this new possibility for uncov-
ering the operations of legal doctrines and orders, which often appear 
beyond our reach. 
IV. Sovereignty: The Interdisciplinary Link Between Law, Literature, 
and Cinema
Studying how legal forms like the Civil Rights Act of 1968, literary 
forms like Gary Snyder’s Earth House Hold, and cinematic depictions 
of the Vietnam War are interwoven in their consideration of sovereign-
ty, entails thinking about fl ows of power and representation, as well 
as potentially reformatting our notions of representation itself. Critics 
typically distinguish, however, between the operative power of literary 
representations and legal doctrines. Legal documents are routinely con-
sidered to have immediate effects unlike representations. One is accus-
tomed, for instance, to locating the impacts of the Civil Rights Act more 
quickly and easily than those of Gary Snyder’s idealization of American 
Indian lifestyles and reservations. However, looking at how legal doc-
trines instill concepts like sovereignty with representational, aestheti-
cized properties shows the ways in which representational constructs 
also then function to re-inscribe legal concepts at the level of the image. 
At the site of the image, these aestheticized constructs are endowed with 
qualities like affect. Even representation expands beyond its lingual co-
ordinates as literary culture and legal culture engage each other. So, 
Gary Snyder’s imagination of personal, tribal, and national sovereignty 
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perpetuates, responds to, and creates new images of sovereignty at work 
in the legal imaginary just as legal doctrines impact literary production. 
Both contribute to how we imagine and experience the sovereign image. 
It is through the moving image then, which refl ects cross-disciplinary 
conversations in transit, that we can trace the movements of sovereignty 
and jurisdiction, noticing where and how these concepts are derived and 
felt. Moreover, we can think through the moving image as a non-static, 
continually shifting place where the functions and operations of sover-
eignty can be tracked. Such a process enables us to resist designating any 
ultimate veracity to images, so that while we may notice the formation 
of sovereignty, we need not be resigned to any ultimate form or shape it 
might take. We can acknowledge the shifting nature of images, and thus 
fi nd agency to rewrite and re-imagine the legal concepts that form our 
personal and national affi liations. 
Notes
 1 In cases of abortion, for example, where the right to privacy has been construed 
as a claim to personal sovereignty, we fi nd ostensibly confl icting interests in au-
tonomy when we try to decide whose body or personhood should be granted 
acknowledgement—the mother, the embryo, the fetus, or the unborn child?
 2 The Bill of Rights was fi nally explicitly extended three years subsequent to the 
Collifl ower decision, extending the right of habeus corpus to members of all 
tribes.
 3 As this essay will later show, this distinction between ideological and material as-
sumption of jurisdiction is especially intriguing given Snyder’s counter-cultural 
re-imagining of the reservation which invokes similar contradictions between 
spirit and material geography.
 4 Much of postcolonial scholarship has been bounded by particular global geo-
graphic areas after the “end” of colonizing periods in the 20th century. Native 
Americans seem largely left out of these discussions, no doubt in part because of 
their confronting complicated ongoing legal relationship to the Federal govern-
ment of the United States of America—and their arguable positions as “post” 
colonial subjects. There has not been a geographic removal of the colonizing 
forces in the United States in the same ways in which there has bee in India, 
parts of Africa, and the Caribbean, for instance. The work of Bhabha, and Said, 
while theoretically relevant to the situations of Native Americans, has then of-
ten not explicitly included them as subjects of study. There are exceptions to 
postcolonial theory’s general global focus outside the United States, like the an-
thology Postcolonial Theory and the United States: Race, Ethnicity, and Literature. 
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Ed. Amrijit Singh and Peter Schmidt. Biloxi: U of Mississippi P, 2000, which 
considers postcolonial theory’s impact on the consideration of race in the United 
States.
 5 Defi nitions of tribalhood have been debated in other arenas as well. See also, 
for instance, Jack Campisi, “The Mashpee Indians: Tribe on Trial.” Readings in 
American Law. Ed. Jo Carillo. Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1998. 32–42. There, 
Campisi relates court proceedings designed to ascertain the defi nition of a tribe 
for purposes of deciding whether the Mashpees constituted one.
 6 See, for instance, Hamid Nafi cy. An Accented Cinema: Exilic and Diasporic 
Filmmaking. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2001. In that text Nafi cy argues about 
techniques of fragmented, critically juxtaposed narrative structures used to re-
veal doubled and lost characters and politicized structures of feeling in postcolo-
nial, exilic, and diasporic fi lms.
 7 For consideration of how legal decisions have impacted people’s actual appear-
ances within the U.S. borders, see Ian Haney Lopez. White by Law. New York: 
NYU P, 1996.
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